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USING FRAMEWORK STATUTES TO FACILITATE U.S. TREATYMAKING 
 
 
What can be learned from the exemplary Congressional-Executive cooperation achieved in 
the negotiation, approval, and implementation of new U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs)?  The 
significance of these FTAs for economic growth and international trade policy has been examined.
1
  
Yet insufficient attention has been given to the legal implications of this development for how the 
United States makes international commitments.  Although U.S. trade agreements are gaining 
approval through enactment of a law, most other important U.S. international agreements face a 
more daunting challenge of gaining the “advice of consent” of the U.S. Senate by a two-thirds vote.  
In my view, the method used for trade is a good model for how U.S. negotiating and treatymaking 
could be carried out in other fields of international law.  So far, little discussion has occurred about 
the value of such mimesis for U.S. Constitutional practice. 
 This comment seeks to open that constitutional door.  Part I introduces the topic by 
contrasting the reliable process used for U.S. trade agreements to the less predictable process used 
for other treaties.  The next two parts examine some key issues in considering a broader use of the 
trade agreement method.  Part II addresses constitutionality and Part III the democratic acceptability 
of such a change.  Part IV explains the centrality of a framework statute to enable the President and 
Congress to work in tandem in making international commitments.  Part V concludes.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
                                                
This is the final draft version of the paper published in the American Journal of International Law, 
October 2004. 
1
See generally FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS. U.S. STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 
2004). 
 2
During the first seven months of 2004, the United States consummated bilateral FTAs with 
Australia and Morocco, and a regional FTA with the Dominican Republic and Central America.  
The U.S.-Australia FTA was agreed to on February 8, 2004, signed on May 18, formally submitted 
to Congress on July 6, and by July 15, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate had 
adopted legislation to “approve” and implement the FTA.
2
  The U.S.-Morocco FTA was agreed to 
on March 2, 2004, signed on June 15, formally submitted to Congress on July 15, and by July 22, 
the Congress had adopted implementing legislation.
3
  The United States-Dominican Republic-
Central America FTA has been signed, and the timing of its submission to Congress depends on the 
forthcoming U.S. elections.  
More FTAs are on the way.  The United States is finalizing an FTA with Bahrain, and is in 
various stages of negotiation with Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Thailand, and the five-nation 
Southern Africa Customs Union.  Each FTA will get a prompt Congressional vote so long as the 
agreement is entered into before June 1, 2005, the expiration date in the 2002 law granting the 
President “Trade Promotion Authority.”
4
   
The Congressional vote tallies show the success of the trade agreement approval process. 
Trade Promotion Authority was initially employed in 2003 when the Congress approved FTAs with 
Chile and Singapore by substantial majorities—over 63 percent in the House and over 67 percent in 
                                                
2
See United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108–286, §2 
(2004). 
3
See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-__ 
(2004). 
4
19 USCS § 3803(a) (2004).  This deadline may be extended to 2007 by the President.   
 3
the Senate.  The recent FTAs with Australia and Morocco gained even greater support, over 74 
percent in the House and over 83 percent in the Senate.   
These huge majorities are especially impressive when one recalls that the law providing 
Trade Promotion Authority took many years to come to fruition.
5
  Similar trade authority, then 
called “fast track,”
 6
 was granted by Congress in 1988, and was used to approve and implement U.S. 
participation in the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Unfortunately, after the expiration of that authority in 1994, 
Congressional politics prevented a renewal until 2002.  As a consequence, the intervening eight 
years were largely fallow for new two-way trade liberalization.   
When President George W. Bush came into office, he sought trade negotiating authority.  In 
a speech to business leaders in mid-2001, he explained: 
But in order for me to be effective on trade, I need trade promotion authority.  I 
need the ability to speak with a single voice for our country.  I need to have the 
capacity as an administration to negotiate free trade agreements without the 
                                                
5
See Laura L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-First Century, 12 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 979 (2004). 
6
The term “fast track” was used in the 1988 law authorizing trade negotiations, but that term was 
dropped in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002.  Compare 19 USCS § 2903(b) 
(2004) with 19 USCS § 3803 (2004).  Apparently, the term “fast track” was thought to carry too 
much political baggage.  
 4
fear of them being undermined.  Otherwise, our trading partners are going to 
be confused and concerned about an honest and open dialog.
7
 
Following some close votes, the Congress succeeded in crafting a multi-step framework for new 
trade negotiations.  Specifically, the new statute: (1) gave the President a negotiating mandate, (2) 
set 17 principal U.S. negotiating objectives, (3) required regular consultation between the Executive 
Branch and the Congress, (4) set timetables for various notifications and reports to the Congress, (5) 
solicited reports from numerous advisory committees, and (6) guaranteed prompt House and Senate 
consideration, without amendment, of implementing legislation, as prepared by the President 
following consultations with the relevant Congressional committees.
8
 
 This temporary procedure supplements the President’s inherent negotiating authority.  Under 
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of U.S. Constitution, “He shall have power, by and with the advice 
and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur . . . 
.”
9
  Thus, the President may choose to submit trade agreements to the Senate as Article II “treaties,” 
and throughout American history, many agreements on “Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,” 
investment, and trade relations have gone through the “advice and consent” process.  In recent 
decades, however, the President has not exercised the Article II option for trade agreements. 
Instead, he has sent trade agreements to the House and Senate for approval and implementation 
through the legislative process.   
                                                
7
Remarks to the Business Roundtable, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS. GEORGE W. BUSH 2001, 
Vol. 1, at 705, 708. 
8
19 USCS § 3801 et seq. (2004). 
9
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.  Hereinafter, this clause will be referred to as “Article II.” 
 5
 The contemporary U.S. practice is for trade agreements to be considered on a fast track and 
non-trade agreements on the slower track of Senate “advice and consent.”
10
 This divergence is 
puzzling.  Trade agreements are negotiated and approved using framework procedures that promote 
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches.  Yet other topics of international 
cooperation are pursued without a statutory framework and sometimes without cooperation between 
the President and the Senate.  These diverging approaches can lead to unequal results. 
The slower track of Senate “advice and consent” sometimes works to effectuate new 
international engagements, but sometimes it fails.
11
  One recurring problem is Senate inaction.  
Under Senate rules, no expedited procedure exists whereby a President can call for a vote on a 
                                                
10
U.S. Presidents use a variety of authorities to achieve new international agreements.  The most 
prominent are:   
 1.  a “sole executive agreement” based on the President’s independent Constitutional 
authority, 
2.   an agreement pre-authorized by Congress, 
3.   an agreement submitted to Congress for review and approval, 
4.  an agreement submitted by the President to the Senate for advice and consent. 
This comment discusses the possibility of substituting the third method for many international 
agreements now processed using the fourth method. 
11
LEE HAMILTON (WITH JORDAN TAMA), A CREATIVE TENSION. THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 65 (2002). 
 6




 The field of environmental law provides good examples of ongoing dysfunctions in the 
treaty ratification process.  Consider the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.  This Convention was consented to by the 
Senate in 1992, but remains unratified by the United States because even a dozen years later, the 
Congress has not approved implementing legislation.
13
  The Basel Convention is an unusual episode 
in that Senate consent occurred despite the absence of implementing legislation.  A more common 
outcome is for the Senate to withhold consent while awaiting the adoption of such legislation.  That 
is the predicament of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 1998 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade.
14
  In other instances, an environment convention is sent to the 
                                                
12
Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power under the 
Constitution, 1 AJIL 636, 648 (1907) (noting the sanction of custom for the proposition that where 
certain powers are expressly confided by the Constitution to Congress, the concurrence of both 
houses of Congress is necessary in order to make effective a treaty undertaking). 
13
Linda Roeder, Bush Administration Plans to Introduce Basel Convention Legislation in Congress, 
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 11, 2004, at A-29. 
14
Pat Phibbs, Joining Environmental Treaties Prompts Sharp Debate in the United States, DAILY 
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 19, 2004, at C-1. Even though the Rotterdam Convention is 
about international trade, no special procedure exists to expedite implementing legislation. 
 7
Senate for consent, but then the convention is never brought to a vote.  That was what happened to 
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, a widely-ratified treaty with 188 state parties.   
Securing Senate action on human rights conventions can also prove difficult.  Consider the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise (No. 87).  That convention was sent to the Senate in 1949, but continues to be 
detained in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  One wonders whether 34 senators would 
have the temerity to vote against this fundamental labor rights convention if it were brought to a 
vote.  A similar fate has befallen the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  That Convention has been waiting for Senate 
consideration since 1980.  In some instances, the prospects for gaining Senate consent and/or 
Congressional implementation are so daunting that a treaty is never even transmitted to the Senate.  
That is the story with the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  In the absence of a 
process for working through the myriad issues of state versus federal law and in the face of 
opposition from then-Senator Jesse Helms, no viable path existed to achieve U.S. ratification. 
In some instances, fundamental human rights treaties do emerge from the Senate, but only 
after unconscionable delay.  The most poignant tale of survival occurred with the International 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The Convention was 
transmitted to the Senate in 1949, but not consented to until February 1986.  This consent was 
subject to a declaration that the instrument of ratification not be deposited until after Congress 
adopted implementing legislation.  Doing so took until November 1988, and then the United States 
finally joined the Convention. The 1984 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment suffered considerable, though much less, delay in the 
Congress.  The Convention was transmitted to the Senate in 1988, and consented to in 1990.  The 
 8
enactment of implementing legislation was not completed until 1994, however, after which the 
United States ratified the Convention.   
The need to coordinate treaty consent with implementing legislation is a common problem, 
and can be seen in the processing of the 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption.  That Convention was transmitted to the Senate in 
June 1998.
15
  Separately, the House and Senate began writing implementing legislation.  The two 
pathways converged on September 20, 2000, when the Senate adopted both the resolution of 
ratification and the House-passed implementing bill.
16
 This elapsed time of 27 months may be better 
than average for international agreements that need implementing legislation, but that odyssey is 
significantly longer than the short excursions enjoyed by FTAs. 
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is a multiplex treaty with important 
implications for security, transportation, environment, and human rights.  The Convention began its 
Senate voyage in 1994.  Finally, in early 2004, it was unanimously reported by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, but so far, a full Senate vote has not been scheduled.
17
  
 The different procedural approach for trade versus other agreements is perplexing, and yet a 
close look at current U.S. practice reveals a deeper mystery.  Following the dictates of Trade 
Promotion Authority, the new FTAs negotiated by the Bush Administration do far more than open 
                                                
15
Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Implementation of Intercountry Adoption Convention, 95 AJIL 416 (2001). 
16
146 CONG. REC. S8866 (Sept. 20, 2000). 
17
See Steve Hirsch, Law of the Sea Treaty Getting Submerged, NAT’L J., Apr. 10, 2004, at 1126-27; 
Former Legal Advisers’ Letter on Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, Editors’ Note, 98 
AJIL 307 & n. 1 (2004) 
 9
up trade.  As the chief U.S. trade negotiator explains, “America’s FTAs break new ground—they 
establish prototypes for liberalization in areas such as services, e-commerce, intellectual property 
for knowledge societies, transparency in government regulation, and better enforcement of labor 
and environmental protections.”
18
  The Australia FTA addresses additional areas such as 
pharmaceuticals, law enforcement cooperation, investment, and anti-corruption.
19
 These areas of 
law singularly are often the object of Article II treaties. Yet when these issues are wrapped into an 
FTA, the President and Senate see a way to bypass the Constitution’s advice and consent 
requirements. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Part II provides an overview of two constitutional issues involved in bypassing Senate 
advice and consent:  First, can an Congressional-Executive agreement properly serve as a substitute 
for a treaty approved via the Article II procedure?  Second, and if so, could the method used for 
trade agreements be extended to other agreements? 
 The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines “Congressional-
Executive agreements” as international agreements in which Congress authorizes the President to 
                                                
18
Robert B. Zoellick, Our Credo: Free Trade and Competition, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2003, at A10. 
19
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004 (not yet in force), Annex 2-C, art. 6.5, chap. 
11, art. 17.9, art. 17.10, art. 22.5, available at http://www.ustr.gov.  Some of the provisions on 
pharmaceuticals drew controversy.  Marilyn Chase & Sarah Lueck, In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks 
To Limit Reach of Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at A1; Elizabeth Becker & Robert 




negotiate and conclude an agreement or in which Congress approves an agreement already 
concluded by the President.
20
 According to the Restatement, “the prevailing view is that the 
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every 
instance.”
21
 The Restatement does not dwell on the distinction between an international agreement 
pre-authorized by Congress and an agreement directly approved by Congress.   
 This distinction gained attention in Bruce Ackerman and David Golove’s masterful study Is 
NAFTA Constitutional?
22
  The authors typologize the two forms of Congressional-Executive 
agreement and use the terms “ex ante” and “ex post” to distinguish them.
23
  They call the latter type 
the “modern congressional-executive agreement.”
24
 In their account of the history, the first modern 
agreement was set in motion in 1923 when the Congress tasked the World War Foreign Debt 
Commission to negotiate settlements with countries owing debts to the United States, with those 
agreements then to be considered for “approval” by the Congress.
25
   
                                                
20
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e 




BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995). 
23
Id. at 24, 27. 
24
Id. at 2. 
25
Id. at 40-41.  Nine years after the 1923 law, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs gave a presentation at the ASIL annual meeting where he pointed out this “striking instance 
of international agreement authorized by Congress” and noted how that procedure was “ignoring the 
rule of treaty-making with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.”  J. Charles Linthicum, The 
 11
 Ackerman and Golove seem to apply the term “modern Congressional-Executive 
agreement” to any agreement subsequently approved by the Congress rather than reserving it for 
those approved pursuant to a framework analogous to the one used in the war debt statute.  For 
example, they note the significance of Congressional approval of the Bretton Woods Agreements 
Act.
26
  In that episode, no prior negotiating mandate existed. 
In my view, the truly modern form of Congressional-Executive agreement originates with a 
framework statute that does three things: (1) it invites the Executive to undertake specified 
negotiations, (2) it promises Congressional consideration of a law to approve the resulting 
agreement, and (3) it offers expedited House and Senate procedures.  Trade Promotion Authority is 
the fullest development of such a statute.  It marries an advance negotiating mandate from the 
Congress to a procedure for an ex post vote on any agreement transmitted to the Congress. 
 The question of the constitutional validity of a decision by Congress and the President  
to use a Congressional-Executive agreement may not be justiciable.  The legality of the law 
approving NAFTA was challenged by a group of plaintiffs who contended that NAFTA was void 
because it had not been consented to by a two-thirds Senate vote.  The plaintiffs lost in the U.S. 
district court, but then that decision was ordered vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11
th
 
Circuit on the grounds that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.
27
  
                                                                                                                                                            
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Treaty-Making Power, 26 
ASIL PROC. 249, 252 (1932) (footnote omitted). 
26
ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 22, at 91, 94; 22 USCS §286 (2004). 
27
Made in the USA Foundation et al. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (1999), vacated by 242 
F.3d 1300, 1319-20 (2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).   
 12
 No case before the Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of the ex post form of 
Congressional-Executive agreement.  Nevertheless, an important development recently occurred in 
the Supreme Court’s Garamendi decision finding the preemption of state law by an international 
agreement.
28
  The Court stated that “. . . our cases have recognized that the President has authority 
to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or 
approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”
29
 
None of the authorities cited in the Court’s opinion involved Congressional-Executive agreements 
specifically approved by Congress.  Moreover, the executive agreement at issue in Garamendi had 
not been approved by Congress.  Thus, the dicta in Garamendi about no “approval by Congress” 
might have little weight on that issue.  And yet that statement by the Court breaks new ground in 
seeing “approval by Congress” as a parallel to “ratification by the Senate.”  The dissent also has 
noteworthy dicta.  Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with the dissenters opposing preemption.  In a 
footnote, the dissent quotes Louis Henkin as stating that “there are agreements which the President 
can make on his sole authority and others which he can make only with the consent of the Senate 
(or of both houses), but neither Justice Sutherland [in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. 
                                                
28
American Insurance Association et al. v. John Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) [hereinafter 
“Garamendi”]. The issue in the case was whether a U.S. agreement with Germany regarding 
Holocaust claims preempted California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act.  The Court found 
preemption. See Brandon P. Denning, International Decisions, American Insurance Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, and Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 97 AJIL 950 (2003). 
29
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. 
 13
Ed. 1134, 57 S. Ct. 758 (1937)] nor any one else has told us which are which.”
30
  The appearance of 
this footnote might be read as a judicial acknowledgement of Congressional competence to 
“consent” to international agreements. 
 The constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement in the ex post form has been 
debated for years.  One of the earliest critics was Edwin Borchard in the 1940s who distinguished 
agreements sanctioned by Congress following a negotiation from agreements that are pre-authorized 
by Congress.  Borchard denied the validity of the ex post form while seeming to accept the ex ante 
form in certain circumstances.
31
 When the same Constitutional issue arose in the early 1990s during 
Congressional consideration of the WTO, some critics took the position that Congressional approval 
of a trade agreement could not substitute for a two-thirds vote in the Senate on a resolution of treaty 
ratification.
32
   
 The scholar who received the most attention was Laurence H. Tribe who argued that the ex 
post form of Congressional-Executive agreement was not constitutionally proper even though an ex 
ante delegation by Congress to the President can enable the President to conclude certain 
                                                
30
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430, 436 n. 3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  This footnote in the dissenting 
opinion refers to: LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 222 
(2
nd
 ed. 1996). 
31
Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements–A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616, 621-22 & n. 24, 
653 (1945).  Borchard saw no justification in the Constitution for a power of Congress to sanction, 
approve, validate or ratify international agreements.   
32





 Although any capsulization of Tribe’s nuanced analysis would not do it 
justice, his most salient objection seems to be the textual one that Congressional power to give ex 
post approval to international agreements is not specifically listed in the Constitution.  Tribe is right 
about that, and yet the Constitution is similarly silent on whether the Congress may give ex ante 
agreement-making authority.  If textual silence precludes ex post approval, then why doesn’t it also 
preclude ex ante approval?  Tribe further argues that if it were true that Congress may approve an 
international agreement by law, then Congress, by overriding a President’s veto, would have a path 
for “ratifying any such international agreement even over the President’s vehement objection,” and 
such a result would be “dramatically at odds with the well-accepted principle that the President is 
the primary representative of the nation in foreign affairs.”
34
  The problem with this argument, 
however, is that only the President may ratify an international agreement.
35
 The Congress itself 
cannot ratify a treaty or demand that the President do so.  
A Congressional competence to give ex post approval to an international agreement would 
seem to be conceptually intertwined with the power of Congress to give advance authorization for 
                                                
33
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1234-35 n. 47, 1258, 1261, 1269-70, 1277-
78 (1995).  An extensive response to Tribe’s thesis appears in David M. Golove, Against Free-
Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1791 (1998). 
34
Tribe, supra note 33, at 1254. 
35




  The logic of representative government is in some tension with the claim 
that Congressional authorization for an international agreement must occur before the President 
negotiates it, and may not occur after the Congress has read it.  Both the ex ante and ex post forms 
of Congressional-Executive agreement stem from the same premise that the Article II Senate 
consent procedure is not the exclusive means of enabling the United States to enter into an 
international agreement.   
 No contemporary scholarship has come to my attention arguing that Senate consent via 
Article II is a precondition for the United States to enter into any international agreement.  Rather, 
the debate has been whether there are some agreements that must receive consent from two-thirds of 
the Senate.   
 One apparent limitation is that an international agreement containing a commitment for 
action beyond Congress’s legislative powers would have to be an Article II treaty.  As Detlev F. 
                                                
36
See Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 148 (1998); David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1992 (2003) (explaining that ex post agreements 
are ex ante in a Constitutional sense because Congressional approval takes place before the 
President makes a binding commitment).  Perhaps the earliest scholarship to question the 
before/after distinction is the seminal study, Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and 
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National 
Policy, Part 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 199-200 n. 22 (1945) (“One wonders again where constitutional 
basis can be found for introducing a time element—valid before Presidential action, invalid after 
Presidential action—into Congress’s powers to authorize or sanction international agreements 
within the scope of its competence.”).  
 16
Vagts has noted, proponents of Congressional-Executive agreements have always conceded that any 
such agreement must be justifiable under a Congressional power to enact legislation.
37
  Yet that 
constraint does not illuminate a clear line because the delineation of Congress’s enumerated 
legislative powers remains contested, especially in an era in which the Supreme Court is narrowing 
the limits on when federal law can oust state governmental authority.
38
    
Further delineation may hinge on the significance of the international agreement at issue.  
Several analysts have posited that the importance of an international agreement, its permanence, or 
its potential impact on U.S. sovereignty may require that such an agreement obtain consent from 
two-thirds of the Senate.  For example, Louis Henkin stated that “[t]he constitutionality of the 
Congressional-Executive agreement is established . . . ,” but that “doubts might spark if it were used 
for an agreement traditionally dealt with by treaty and that seems to ask for the additional ‘dignity’ 
of a treaty, for example, a major alliance or disarmament agreement.”
39
  Laurence H. Tribe 
                                                
37
Vagts, supra note 36, at 147.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20 § 303(2) and the 
quotation above from McDougal and Lans, supra note 36. 
38
See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 
(2003) (discussing the recent cases). 
39
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 217.  The reference to “dignity” comes from Altman case where the 
Supreme Court decided that the term “treaty” in a jurisdictional statute also encompassed a 
commercial agreement that had been pre-authorized by the Congress yet “was not a treaty 
possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate . . . .”  B. Altman & Co. v. United 
States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912).  The Altman Court thus implicitly acknowledged the existence of 
a class of U.S. international compacts that did not require consent by the Senate.  The implications 
of this holding for facilitating U.S. international agreements was recognized immediately by the 
 17
explained that “In deciding whether an international agreement is of the type into . . . which the 
President may not enter without the consent of a Senate supermajority, one must consider the 
degree to which an agreement constrains federal or state sovereignty and submits United States 
citizens or political entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially separate from the ordinary 
arms of federal or state government.”
40
  Andrew T. Hyman postulated that any significant long-term 
international compact must be treated as an Article II treaty.
41
  These assorted claims about the 
exclusivity of Article II are derived from the Constitutional text and the original intent of the 
framers regarding a special Senate role as adviser to the President and as institutional guardian of 
the states.  Moreover, as Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband have noted, the two-thirds 
requirement and its formulation suggests that the framers of the Constitution “wanted important 
international commitments made by a process requiring a higher degree of consensus than is needed 
to pass an ordinary law.”
42
 
Nevertheless, an originalist intent about Senate advice and consent needs to be considered in 
light of the evolving practice over the next two centuries of effectuating many international 
                                                                                                                                                            
editors of the AJIL.  Applicability of the Case of Altman v. The United States to Special Agreements 
Concluded under a General Treaty of Arbitration, 6 AJIL 716 (1912). 
40
Tribe, supra note 33, at 1268. 
41
Andrew T. Hyman, The Unconstitutionality of Long-term Nuclear Pacts that are Rejected by One-
Third of the Senate, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 313, 316-17 (1995).  The framework statute for 
the negotiation of nuclear pacts is 42 USCS 2153 (2004). 
42
THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 144 (1979). 
 18
agreements without use of Article II’s formal procedures.
43
  As early as 1792, in a law that gave 
birth to the ex ante Congressional-Executive agreement, the Congress provided authority to the 
Postmaster General to make arrangements with other countries.
44
  By the late 19th century, the use 
of such advance authority became more frequent as did actions by the President to enter into 
international agreements based on sole executive authority.  Such non-use of Senate advice and 
consent was rationalized by a doctrine that a U.S. international agreement not going through the 
Article II process was not a “treaty” under that provision even while serving as a treaty under 
international law.   
This doctrine and the practice it reflects answers my first question posed above.  The 
modern Congressional-Executive agreement may validly serve as a substitute for the Article II 
procedure.   Employing a Congressional-Executive agreement does not transgress the Constitution’s 
separation of powers.  Certainly, it does not reduce the power of the Senate because no agreement 
can be authorized ex ante or approved ex post without the concurrence of the Senate.
45
  To be sure, 
such procedures may undercut the clout of individual senators to delay a Senate treaty vote, but the 
Senate’s tolerance for such obstructionism is hardly required by the Constitution. 
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The second question—how far can we go with the method now used for trade agreements— 
also requires a complex constitutional inquiry.  The most extensive analysis was authored by John 
C. Yoo and published in 2001.
46
 Yoo argues that a Congressional-Executive agreement cannot be 
used when the federal government reaches an agreement on matters outside of the Congressional 
powers identified in Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution or on matters in which the President 
and Congress possess concurrent and potentially conflicting powers.
47
  Based on this theory, Yoo 
states that Congressional-Executive agreements ought to be used for agreements on international 
trade, finance, and intellectual property, but cannot be used for agreements on human rights, 
extradition, political-military issues, and arms control.
48
  He sees environment as lying in-between 
depending on the substance of a particular agreement.
49
 
Both Yoo’s theory and its application to particular agreements are contestable; yet even in 
its formulation, the theory provides capacious opportunities for using Congressional-Executive 
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agreements in many areas where they are not currently used.  For example, under Yoo’s theory, 
Congressional-Executive agreements would be doable for issues such as investment, intellectual 
property, and some environmental agreements.  Whether Yoo has been too cautious in ruling out 
Congressional-Executive agreements for human rights is a matter deserving future analysis. 
 The use of legislation to approve trade agreements is sometimes said to be warranted by the 
Constitutional rule that bills for raising revenue are to originate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.
50
 Although Article II lacks any textual basis for such a claim, the more devastating 
critique is that, far from justifying the singularity of trade agreements, this argument opens the door 
to legislative approval of any revenue-related international agreement.  For example, tax treaties 
might be approved by Congressional-Executive agreement rather than by Senate advice and consent 
as they are now. 
 Another defense for special treatment of trade agreements is “tradition.”  Trade truly is 
distinguishable from other fields in that there is a tradition of processing trade agreements through 
the House-Senate route.
51
 Other fields like environment and labor do not enjoy that tradition.  
Nevertheless, all traditions begin at some point.  The fact that the current crop of FTAs include 
environment and labor commitments may itself be rooting a new tradition of doing without Senate 
advice and consent for those issues. 
 The tradition in U.S. trade policy of circumventing the Senate treaty process began because  
the Senate recognized the disjunction between its authority to consent to a trade treaty and its 
dependence on the House to initiate legislation to implement the agreement.  The initial solution 
reached was to enact a law giving the President ex ante authority to enter into trade agreements.  
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This solution worked for many decades, until the nature of trade agreements expanded to include 
nontariff issues.  Congress responded to this new development by restructuring the process to an ex 
post one whereby a completed trade agreement is put up for a two-house vote. 
 The same imperatives that led to the use of Congressional-Executive agreements on trade 
have now become just as pressing for many other international issues where Senate advice and 
consent is insufficient for the President to carry out a treaty.  The challenge of Congressional 
implementation of treaties was not fully thought through by the framers of the Constitution.
52
  
Nevertheless, they wrote a Constitution dynamic enough to permit elected officials to devise a 
solution through the evolution of practice.  That solution is the Congressional-Executive Agreement 
which uses a single legal instrument to achieve the dual purposes of treaty approval and 
implementation. 
III. DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY 
 Since 1990, some observers have challenged as undemocratic the use of fast-track 
procedures to approve trade agreements.
53
  Critics object to Congressional rules that forbid 
amendments to the proposed implementing legislation, and that provide automatic House and 
Senate votes.  For example, during the 1994 Senate debate on approving the WTO Agreement, 
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Senator Robert C. Byrd lamented “the rape of the legislative process by the fast-track procedures” 
and called these procedures “destructive of the sovereignty of the people of this Republic.”
54
 
 Even if it is true that fast-track procedures do reduce democracy in one metric, this line of 
criticism errs by considering the issue too narrowly.  Democracy is not just a fixed set of 
procedures.  It is a method of government that enables the public to achieve its collective will.  The 
quality of democracy will be a function both of the representativeness of decisionmakers and the 
effectiveness of decisionmaking processes. The procedures employed for trade agreements offer 
several pro-democratic advantages over the procedures typically used in Article II treaties.  One can 
see this by examining three distinct phases of the treatymaking process—international negotiation, 
treaty approval, and domestic implementation. 
 The first phase is international negotiation.  Although prudent Presidents contemplating 
treaties will seek and listen to the guidance of the Senate, regularized modalities often do not exist 
to gain Senate input.  As a result, the views of the President and the Senate may not mesh. 
Recall the most famous episode of Senate obstruction, the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The key counsel from the Senate was the “Round Robin” signed by 37 Republican senators on 
March 4, 1919.
55
  This resolution by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called for finalizing a peace treaty 
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before taking up the League of Nations.  Lodge’s short resolution was offered almost two months 
after the Paris peace talks had begun, and was not voted on by the Senate.  If, instead, President 
Woodrow Wilson had solicited senatorial guidance a timely manner, perhaps the Senate’s 
Weltanschauung and Wilson’s actions would have been better aligned.  When significant Senate 
advice was ultimately given, it bubbled up in the form of numerous “reservations” formulated well 
after the treaty was signed in June.  Although the decades after 1919 have brought much better 
channels of communication between the President and the Senate, some chronic deficiencies persist.   
Fast forward to July 1997:  Several years into the process of negotiating national 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Senate voted 95-0 for the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution.
56
  This resolution states that the United States should not be a signatory to an emissions 
protocol that fails to include commitments for developing countries or that would seriously harm 
the U.S. economy.
57
  To be sure, Byrd-Hagel was better than the 1919 Round Robin in having been 
voted on by the Senate in advance of the negotiations in Kyoto that were expected to finalize the 
Protocol.  Nevertheless, Byrd-Hagel seems a flawed way for the Senate to formulate and 
communicate U.S. negotiating objectives, especially in comparison to Trade Promotion Authority. 
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Consider several key differences:  Trade Promotion Authority is a law passed by both 
houses while Byrd-Hagel is a resolution approved only by the Senate.  In Trade Promotion 
Authority, the Congress gave the Administration a negotiating mandate with detailed objectives to 
be pursued in forthcoming negotiations.  By contrast, in Byrd-Hagel, the Senate merely told the 
Administration what not to do.  No backdrop law setting specific U.S. objectives for climate 
negotiations existed at that time
58
—and still does not!  In Trade Promotion Authority, the entire 
Congress acted positively to empower the President and the U.S. Trade Representative by offering 
them a pathway for implementing a trade agreement.  Yet in Byrd-Hagel, there was no operational 
mandate, unless one counts the gratuitous directive to the U.S. Secretary of State to transmit a copy 
of the resolution to the President.
59
  In Trade Promotion Authority, the Congress designed detailed 
procedures for Executive branch consultations with relevant Congressional committees and 
committee leadership at every stage in the process.
60
  Moreover, members of Congress participate 
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as advisers during trade negotiations.
61
  By contrast for climate change, the Congressional 
participation is less formalized.
62
 
Is the Byrd-Hagel approach for shaping international negotiations more “democratic” than 
Trade Promotion Authority?  Perhaps the estimable Senator Byrd thinks so.  Yet in my view, Byrd-
Hagel is far less democratic both in not being bicameral and in not making a constructive 
contribution toward achieving what the U.S. public seems to want
63
—a workable international 
regime to prevent global climate change.  
The Byrd-Hagel resolution exemplifies the chronic deficiencies in the “advice” half of 
Senate “advice and consent.”  Usually, the counsel given is informal, from individual senators 
rather than from the Senate.  When guidance does come from the Senate as in Byrd-Hagel, the 
guidance may be too-little, too-late.   
Very often, what is missing is an effective process for lawmakers to offer advice to the 
President in advance.  The important role of regular Congressional input on foreign policy was 
expressed well in the dictum that Senator Arthur Vandenberg offered President Harry S Truman in 
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Under Trade Promotion Authority, the Congress stands with the President on takeoff and 
hopefully also on landing.  The framework statute helps to overcome the centrifugal forces of 
Article II which sometimes pull the President and Senate apart and lead them to insist upon their 
prerogatives.  Even Edwin Borchard—perhaps the most energetic academic opponent of replacing 
treaties with executive agreements—recognized that bringing the U.S. House of Representatives 
into the approval process could provide an opportunity for enhancing consultation during the 
making of treaties.
65
   
Another benefit of the trade mechanism is that the negotiating objectives set by Congress are 
transparent to the U.S. public and to the world.  By contrast, in other issue areas, the United States 
often goes into multilateral negotiations without Congressionally-set objectives.  In such situations, 
the President and his Administration will determine the U.S. position, but may not do so in a 
transparent manner and with adequate accountability to the Congress and the public.
66
 
The second of the three phases is treaty approval.  Trade agreements are guaranteed a 
Congressional vote; treaties considered for Senate consent are not.  Moreover, Senate procedures 
have many awkward features.  For example, a practice has developed of including within the 
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resolution of ratification certain declarations that purport to govern how the treaty interacts with 
domestic law.
67
  This practice is certainly not inscribed in the Constitution and seems undemocratic 




The third phase is treaty implementation.  Even when the Senate has consented to a treaty or 
would consent, the United States may fail to become a party because of a lack of implementing 
legislation.  The adoption of implementing legislation will often be a challenge because it requires 
agreement on the same text by the House, the Senate, and the President.   
Not all treaties need implementing legislation.
69
 Yet many do, and it is with those that the 
Senate’s consent role in Article II can fall out-of-sync with the Congress’s legislative role in Article 
I.  In the future, international agreements may increasingly interpenetrate domestic law in difficult 
areas like application to the states and judicial enforcement of individual rights. 
Because contemporary trade agreements will always require implementation, the Congress 
and President have worked together to devise expedited procedures to secure an up-or-down vote on 
such legislation.  Although Congress helps to draft the implementing bill, the ultimate sign-off is 
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with the President to assure that the legislation will be acceptable to him.  The non-amendability of 
the bill avoids the possibility that the House and Senate might not reach a final vote because of 
unresolved differences.  The trade procedures blend a constructivist role for the Congress at the 
initiation of new policy with a parliamentary-style following the completion of negotiations. 
The reason that the procedures for international agreements may validly differ from the 
regular order for domestic legislation is that the United States is part of a larger world.  Although 
“We, the People” of the United States can ultimately control what the U.S. government does, we 
lack that authority with the other 191 governments.  This leads to a basic conundrum for self-
government which is that internal democracy is necessarily incomplete whenever there are public 
needs requiring international cooperation.
70
 A recognition of this interdependence
71
 adds texture to 
our understanding of U.S. constitutional democracy.  
U.S. citizens seeking to influence the direction of the trading system will benefit from 
increasing the capacity of the U.S. government to work with the world.  Without a clear legislative 
path for approving and implementing a new trade agreement, the President will be handicapped in 
negotiating with other governments.  By contrast, when a fast track mechanism is available, the 
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U.S. public has a better chance to succeed through the President in securing needed cooperation 
from other countries.  Surely that posture enhances the quality of American democracy. 
The unique role of the United States in world affairs makes this case even stronger.  Because 
of the bigness of the United States, other countries regularly look to it for leadership.  Yet too often 
the United States fails the international community because, other than in trade, its cumbersome 
procedures for treatymaking do not match its global leadership aspirations.  
Whenever existing U.S. law does not meet the requirements of new trade agreements, the 
implementing legislation proposed by the President makes the requisite statutory changes.  For any 
FTA, there will be changes required in U.S. tariffs.  Yet because trade agreements embrace non-
trade issues, there may also be provisions in domestic law that have to be revised.  When the 
Congress approved and implemented the NAFTA and WTO agreements in the early 1990s, there 
were many such changes accomplished.
72
  The post-2002 FTAs, by contrast, have not necessitated 
many substantive alterations in U.S. domestic law. 
Critics of trade fast track sometimes worry that a hurried Congress will merely rubberstamp 
a bad international agreement, and that this possibility undermines U.S. democracy.  The concern is 
justifiable, and needs to be addressed by assuring that the framework statute assigns Congress a 
significant consultative role.  Moreover, one should not forget that Congress commits only to vote 
on and not necessarily to approve a proposed trade agreement. 
The Congressional consideration of the Singapore and Chile FTAs in 2003 provides an 
example of how the process proved flexible enough to accommodate last-minute adjustments.  Each 
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of these FTAs promised a specific number of U.S. entry visas for business persons.  When the draft 
implementing legislation was being reviewed by the Congress, the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees objected to the draft because it would have granted the visas outside of the overall U.S. 
quota.  Recognizing that it had gone too far, the Administration accepted a change in the draft 
legislation to earmark the visas within the existing quota.
73
 
In addition to showing that the implementation process is not a rubber stamp, this episode 
also points to some possible boundaries in using fast-track procedures to alter domestic law.  In 
response to the contretemps, the Senate passed a resolution stating that “future trade agreements to 
which the United States is a party and the legislation implementing the agreements should not 
contain immigration-related provisions.”
74
  The resolution was not clear, however, as to whether the 
perceived problem was that immigration was being negotiated in an international agreement or that 
a trade agreement was being used to set U.S. immigration policy. 
IV. THE CENTRALITY OF A FRAMEWORK STATUTE 
In the second edition of Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution (1996), Louis 
Henkin writes that “the constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement seems 
established, it is used regularly at least for trade and postal agreements, and remains available to the 
President for wide, even general use should the treaty process again prove difficult,” provided that a 
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majority of the Senate is willing.
75
  In another book he authored, Henkin suggests that “it may be 
time for the two houses to seek—at least—to develop a general principle for identifying 
international agreements that might be sent to both houses for approval rather than to the Senate 
alone.”
76
  In this comment, I call for Congress identify other international issues besides trade that 
would benefit from a bicameral approval procedure.   
The essence of the modern Congressional-Executive agreement is a forward-looking process 
whereby the Congress votes to authorize the President to negotiate under certain conditions and 
then puts to a vote any agreement submitted.  The two Congressional decisions on each end provide 
the trusses of a more democratic architecture for U.S. treatymaking.  This architecture blends the 
benefits of Presidential leadership with Congressional oversight over U.S. international 
commitments.   
The ordering of mandate first and approval second is not required by the Constitution.  What 
does depend on this order, however, is the political practicality of replicating the trade agreement 
experience in other areas of international law.  The trade process has succeeded because all the 
players share the expectation that the framework of two-house approval will be used in place of 
Senate advise and consent.
77
 Such expectations can only apply to future actions.  That is why I am 
not suggesting that the Congress take some dusty treaties off the Senate’s shelf, and consider an ad 
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hoc law to approve them.  The two-house procedure is most legitimate when applied prospectively 
pursuant to a framework statute. 
The idea of a “framework” statute was conceptualized in 1976 by Gerhard Casper.
78
  Casper 
pointed to the War Powers Resolution and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
as examples of law that “interprets the Constitution by providing a legal framework for the 
governmental decisionmaking process.”
79
  He explained that a framework statute does not formulate 
specific policies for the resolution of specific problems, but rather attempts to implement 
constitutional policies.  In Casper’s vision, the purpose of a framework statute is to regulate 
decisionmaking and add stability to the relationship between the President and Congress. 
Building on Casper’s insight 14 years later, Harold Hongju Koh emphasized the constructive 
potential of “framework” legislation on national security matters.
80
  Koh suggested that such a 
statute should “acknowledge the executive’s leading constitutional role in foreign affairs, at the 
same time as it seeks to reduce the isolation that currently surrounds executive branch deliberations, 
and to increase congressional-executive dialogue while foreign policy objectives are being set and 
initiatives implemented.”
81
 Although he did not specifically endorse the idea of enacting framework 
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statutes for other topics, Koh called for “centralizing congressional procedures for deciding whether 
particular substantive agreements should be ratified by treaty or executive agreement.”
82
 
In my view, the Senate and House should use a framework statute for many topics of 
international agreement that could then bypass the Senate’s creaky advice and consent process.
83
  
The practice of doing this for trade and almost nowhere else is unjustifiable, especially as U.S. trade 
agreements increasingly incorporate non-trade issues.
84
  Recall the reasons stated by President Bush 
as to why he wanted Trade Promotion Authority—the need to speak with a single voice and the 
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value of an honest and open dialog with other governments.  This same situation exists in other 
fields of international law, and yet no specialized “Promotion Authority” is available for U.S. 
international objectives other than trade.   
One example of where a framework law could have been useful was the drafting of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where U.S. negotiators lacked transparent 
negotiating objectives.  The Congress did not get around to passing a framework law on the ICC 
until over four years after the Rome Statute was adopted.  That law—the American 
Servicemember’s Protection Act—is essentially reactive and encourages the President to negotiate 
bilateral agreements with other countries to safeguard U.S. personnel from the ICC’s grasp.
85
 
 An advance negotiating mandate from the Congress is especially important in the most 
delicate area of U.S. treatymaking, that is, when the United States promises to make significant 
changes in its domestic law.  This result may occur by design in trade negotiations, as happened 
with NAFTA and the WTO.  In such situations, the Congress uses implementing legislation to 
conform U.S. law to the trade agreement.  Yet in other fields that lack a framework statute, the 
process often operates in reverse.  U.S. negotiators may resist provisions in new international 
agreements that require changes in U.S. law.  In effect, U.S. negotiators aim to conform the protean 
treaty to existing domestic law.   
 The framework approach used in trade can be deployed in a variety of ways.  It can be used 
to guide U.S. participation in specialized international organizations (e.g., the World Health 
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Organization), in autonomous institutional arrangements (e.g., the ozone regime), and in 
transgovernmental fora (e.g., the G-8).  It can also be used when a new series of bilateral 
agreements is contemplated (e.g., extradition). 
Although Trade Promotion Authority serves as a useful prototype, the framework statute for 
each issue area needs to be individualized.  Perhaps the most significant variable is the amount of 
substantive decisionmaking called for in the national implementation of a new treaty.  The recent 
U.S. FTAs have been on the low end of the scale with little discretion left to the parties.  Climate 
change lies on the high end because under the Kyoto Protocol each party retains considerable 
flexibility as to how to comply with the emissions target.  When a treaty combines substantive 
obligations with low “prescriptiveness” on how to achieve them, the rapid Congressional 
procedures used for trade would not be transferable without significant modification. 
Another design feature to explore is whether to require more than a simple majority vote in 
the Congress to approve a particular kind of international agreement.  Throughout the long debate 
on the treaty approval process, most of the attention has surrounded the dichotomy between the 
current two-thirds rule and a simple majority of both houses.
86
  Nevertheless, those are not the only 
choices available.  The special procedures for approving trade agreements require a simple majority 
in each house, and yet that percentage may be raised by changing the House and Senate rules in the 
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Trade Promotion law.  The main key to the success of these procedures has been the automatic up-
or-down vote in each house rather than the level of majority required.
87
   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The blossoming of the modern Congressional-Executive agreement for trade negotiations 
shows how constitutional practice can evolve to facilitate U.S. economic cooperation with other 
countries. The practice of having separate tracks for Senate consent to a treaty and that treaty’s 
implementation does not operate as effectively as using a single fast track to authorize negotiations 
and then tee up a Congressional vote on approving and implementing the ensuing agreement.  This 
procedure works for trade because the Congress and the President have agreed to a framework to 
codify the expectations that each branch has for the other’s behavior.  The time has come to apply 
the lessons of this trade law innovation to other important transborder and global challenges facing 
the United States. 
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Most U.S. trade agreements put to a vote have received broad Congressional approval, but one 
had a close vote. In November 1993, the Congress approved NAFTA by a 53.9 percent majority in 
the House and a 61.6 percent majority in the Senate.  
